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I. INTRODUCTION
The prohibition of employment discrimination based on sex was included
in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with little debate or even thought as to its
possible enforcement.1 It was not until 1986 that the Supreme Court recog-
nized a hostile, sexually harassing work environment as a form of employment
discrimination.2 Despite the current recognition of sexual harassment as
employment discrimination, however, the remedies available to the victims of
such harassment have been inadequate.
This article addresses the various ways in which Title VII falls short of the
goal of eliminating sexual harassment in the workplace. Previous articles have
taken on various aspects of the problem, but in light of recent Congressional
action surrounding the Civil Rights and Women's Equality in Employment Act
of 1991,' this seems an appropriate time to practically reassess which of Title
VII's flaws can actually be corrected by legislation.
The proposed Act would amend Title VII to allow victims of sexual
harassment to recover compensatory and punitive damages in some instances.
This amendment would correct the glaring inadequacy of available relief under
present anti-discrimination law. Currently, Title VII offers only injunctive
relief and restitution for economic injuries such as lost wages. Thus even those
sexually harassed women who succeed in Title VII suits are rarely compensat-
ed for the actual nature and extent of the harms that they suffer.4 In particular,
t Associate, Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, Washington, D.C.; J.D., Yale, 1991.
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1. See CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE 1964 CIvIL RIGHTS ACT 238 (1985) (characterizing women as "accidental beneficiarlies]" of Civil
Rights Act); 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84, 2718-21 (1964). Rep. Smith, who proposed the addition of sex
to Title VII, stated, "I do not think it can do any harm to this legislation; maybe it can do some good."
Id. at 2577. He introduced the amendment with the hope of defeating the entire Title VII package. For
a more detailed account of the original intent and enforcement of the first federal laws prohibiting sex-based
employment discrimination, see Leo Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law 111: Title WI
of the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 305, 310-13 (1968).
2. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-69 (1986).
3. The bill, H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991), was originally introduced on January 3, 1991 as
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 137 CONG. REC. E33 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1991).
The Bush Administration has proposed an alternative "Civil Rights Act of 1991," introduced as H.R.
1375, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991). The complete text appears at 137 CONG. REC. H 1662 (daily ed. Mar.
12, 1991).
4. See sources cited infta note 7 for a discussion of the nature and extent of the harms suffered by
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these victims are unable to seek compensatory damages for psychological or
emotional injuries.5 Often the primary injury suffered by victims of sexual
harassment is non-economic, particularly if the harassment involves a hostile
work environment.6 Effects can include stress; high blood pressure; nausea;
insomnia; weight loss; anorexia; and damage to self-esteem, personal relation-
ships, and reputation.7 Ironically, because monetary relief is limited to restitu-
tion of economic losses, there have been cases where plaintiffs were able to
show the existence of harassing behavior in the workplace, but were denied
any relief because they could not demonstrate economic injury.'
In 1990, the U.S. Congress finally attempted to address the inadequacy of
the relief provided by Title VII for instances of sexual harassment.9 The Civil
Rights Act of 1990, ultimately vetoed by President Bush, proposed amend-
ments to Title VII that would have provided for compensatory and punitive
damages in certain sexual harassment cases." But the Act of 1990, like the
sexual harassment victims.
5. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Detroit Edison
Co., 515 F.2d 301, 308-09 (6th Cir. 1975) vacated on other grounds, 431 U.S. 951 (1977); Van Hoomis-
sen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829, 835-36 (N.D. Cal. 1973). For a more detailed discussion of Title
VII's failure to provide adequate remedy, see CAROLINE NEWKIRK, ELLEN VARGYAS & MARCIA GREEN-
BERGER, TITLE VII's FAILED PROMISE: THE IMPACT OF THE LACK OF A DAMAGES REMEDY (1990) (report
by the National Women's Law Center); Note, Relief for Hostile Work Environment Discrimination:
Restoring Title VIi's Remedial Powers, 99 YALE L.J. 1611, 1611-19 (1990) [hereinafter Note, Restoring
Title VI].
But see Beesley v. Hartford Fire Ins., 717 F. Supp. 781 (N.D. Ala. 1989), reconsidered at 723 F.
Supp. 635, 652 (N.D. Ala. 1989) (finding that sexual harassment plaintiff has legal right to jury trial and
request for punitive and compensatory damages in Title VII case).
6. The federal courts and the EEOC currently recognize two types of sexual harassment, quid pro
quo harassment, and hostile work environment. The hostile work environment is defined as an employment
situation where an employee is subjected to pervasive, unwelcome sexual comments, derogatory remarks,
touching, assault, or even rape. The harassing activities must be sufficiently pervasive or severe that they
affect the terms or conditions of employment. Quidpro quo harassment is defined as the explicit or implicit
use of submission to sexual requests as a condition of receipt or denial of a work benefit. See EEOC
guidelines defining sexual harassment infra note 70.
7. See e.g., CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 47-48 (1979);
U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: AN
UPDATE 41 (1988); Ben Bursten, Psychiatric Injury in Women's Workplaces, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. OF
PSYCHIATRY & LAW 245, 245 (1986); Peggy Crull, Stress Effects of Sexual Harassment on the Job:
Implications for Counseling 52 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 539, 541 (1982).
8. See, e.g., Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth, 882 F.2d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 758 (1990) ("[Slince [the plaintiff] cannot recover any award under Title VII, [the
employer] must receive judgment even if there has been a violation of that statute."). In other Circuits
judges have awarded nominal damages to plaintiffs in order to be able to award attorney's fees as well,
or have recommended such a result in dicta. See, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 253 n.1 (1983);
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,905-06 (1lth Cir. 1982); Spencer v. General Elec., 697 F. Supp.
204, 219 (E.D. Va. 1988). Although this is a less perverse result, it does not begin to address the actual
damage suffered by plaintiffs.
9. For a look at the bills as they were introduced, see H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) and
S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (both introduced on Feb. 7, 1990 and both named "The Civil Rights
Act of 1990"). The bill that was recommended by conference committee and vetoed by President Bush
on Oct. 22, 1990 was S. 2104.
10. The original amendment provided in both bills would have added to the relief section of Title VII
(§ 706(g)) as follows:
With respect to an unlawful employment practice [other than disparate impact]-
(A) compensatory damages may be awarded; and
(B) if the respondent (other than a government, agency, or a political subdivision) engaged in
Act of 1991 which proposes the same amendments, would not resolve all of
the problems facing both women in the workplace and sexual harassment
plaintiffs in court.
This article argues that a damages amendment is, indeed, an important
positive step. Title VII should be amended to improve the enforcement of its
prohibition against sexual harassment and to provide more complete remedies
to compensate victims for the actual damages they suffer. But while a new
damages provision of Title VII, like the ones proposed in the Civil Rights Act
of 1990 and again in the Civil Rights and Women's Equality in Employment
Act of 1991, would be likely to provide more adequate and fair compensation
to victims of sexual harassment, these victims would still face substantial
obstacles in court, such as inappropriate standards of proof and use of plain-
tiffs' sexual history as evidence. These obstacles, however, could be addressed
through use of evidentiary standards and burdens of proof tailored to the
particular problems raised by sexual harassment cases."
Finally, this article examines the implementation issues created by Con-
gress' recommended amendments to Title VII as well as my suggested reinter-
pretations of Title VII law and doctrine. I conclude that although there is a
great deal of current and potential controversy surrounding these suggestions,
full implementation of the amendments and my suggestions would not impose
any unfair burdens on innocent employers. In addition, it is likely that the
proposed changes would have a positive impact outside of the litigation con-
text. The new remedies and standards would constitute a major improvement
in achieving Title VII's dual goals of ending employment discrimination and
making its victims whole."
the unlawful employment practice with malice, or with reckless or callous indifference to the
Federally protected rights of others, punitive damages may be awarded against such respondent
in addition to the relief authorized by the preceding sentences of this subsection, except that
compensatory damages shall not include back pay or any interest thereon.
If compensatory or punitive damages are sought with respect to a claim arising under this title,
any party may demand a trial by jury.
The final compromise bill sent to the President included a limitation on damages proposed by Senator
Boren. There would be no cap on compensatory damages, but punitive damages would have been limited
to $150,000 or the amount of compensatory damages and back pay, whichever was greater. 136 CONG.
REC. S15,327 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1990). In his veto message sent to Congress rejecting the Civil Rights
Act of 1990, President Bush indicated that he was nonetheless in favor of "provisions creating new
monetary remedies for the victims of practices such as sexual harassment [allowing additional equitable
awards of up to $150,000]." 136 CoNG. REC. S 16,457 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990).
11. By characterizing sexual harassment as a form of employment discrimination, legislators, judges,
and theorists are making the claim that sexual harassment fits our social conception of discrimination that
grew out of the consciousness-raising of the civil rights movement. But sexual harassment is neither just
like nor completely analytically distinct from the paradigm case of racial discrimination, particularly with
respect to the treatment of women of color. The implications of this tension in sexual harassment law will
be discussed more fully infra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., 118 CoNG. REC. 7168 (1972) (section-by-section analysis introduced by Senator
Williams to accompany Conference Committee Report on Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972
strongly reaffirming both purposes of Title VII); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)
("It is also the purpose of Title VII to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful
employment discrimination.").
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II. How DOES A COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES PROVISION
IN TITLE VII COMPARE WITH OTHER CURRENTLY AVAILABLE REMEDIES?
Title VII is not the only potential source of compensation for victims of
sexual harassment. However, examination of the major existing and proposed
alternative remedies for sexual harassment at both the state and federal level
demonstrates that a damages amendment to Title VII would provide a more
equitable and efficient solution. Finally, this section takes a brief comparative
look at the remedies available for racial harassment. Such a comparison is
useful both as an examination of alternative remedies, and because remedies
for racial harassment play a significant role in the public debate about damages
for sexual harassment. 3
A. State Anti-Discrimination and Workers' Compensation Laws
A few states have anti-discrimination laws in place that provide prohibitions
against sexual harassment similar to those contained in Title VII.'4 Most of
these state statutes also share Title VII's approach of offering damages only
for economic injuries suffered as a result of employment discrimination."5
Providing adequate compensatory and punitive relief for victims of sexual
harassment through state discrimination laws would therefore require fifty-one
separate legislative amendment efforts.
Workers' compensation laws in many states may provide some compensa-
tion for non-economic injuries which result from workplace discrimination.' 6
However, workers' compensation rarely offers make-whole relief, and in some
states acts as a bar to tort claims arising out of harassing behavior at work. 7
If victims of workplace harassment are not explicitly included in workers'
compensation statutory language, they are often caught in a Catch-22. If the
13. See infra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
14. For a list of the states which have such laws and the complete text of those law, see 3 EMP. PRAC.
GUIDE (CCH 1991). For discussion of these laws as they compare to Title VII, see Sarah Wald, Alterna-
tives to Title VII: State Statutory and Common-Law Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 5 HARv.
WOMEN'S L.J., 35, 41-44 (1982); Note, Inadequacies in CivilRights Law: The Needfor Sexual Harassment
Legislation 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 1149, 1164-65 (1987) (hereinafter Note, Inadequacies in CivilRights Law).
15. Wald, supra note 14, at 42. But see also Coley v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 561 F. Supp. 645
(E.D. Mich. 1982) (awarding sexual harassment victim damages for mental anguish and humiliation under
Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act in a claim combined with Title VII).
16. As originally conceived, workers' compensation laws developed as a system of strict liability to
employers for accidents in the workplace. Some states have expanded these schemes to include all
workplace injuries, but even this formulation of workers' compensation does not obviously include
workplace harassment.
17. See Note, A Theory of TortLiabilityfor Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REV.
1461, 1490 (1986) ("The major obstacle to holding an employer liable for sexual harassment is the workers'
compensation system.") (hereinafter Note, A Theory of Tort Liability).
The view that sexual harassment is a work hazard under the possible jurisdiction of workers'
compensation laws is nbt universally held. As the court in Bennett v. Furr's Cafeterias noted, "[I1t would
appear to lie outside the bounds of reason to propose that the sort of sexual assault and harassment
heretofore described and emotional trauma alleged to have been caused thereby result from risks inherent
to the position of 'management trainee.'" 549 F. Supp 887, 890 (D. Colo. 1982).
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harasser was acting within the scope of employment, the only option may be
partial relief under workers' compensation. But, if the harasser was not acting
within the scope of employment, the doctrine of respondeat superior prevents
the victim from suing the employer at all in tort. 8
B. Tort Claims
Several articles have been written on the use of state tort claims as either
an alternative or a companion to Title VII sexual harassment claims. 9 Sexual
harassment injuries have been tried under a long list of tort causes of action
including assault and battery, intrusion/invasion of privacy, tortious interfer-
ence with contractual relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
However, these ancient common law doctrinal standards do not fit easily with
a wrong that has been legally acknowledged only in the last two decades. No
common law theory yet provides an adequate remedy for the harms of sexual
harassment, even in combination with a Title VII claim.2'
Some commentators have therefore advocated the creation of a new tort
of sexual harassment.2' Such proposals obviously recognize an incompatibility
between existing tort law and the injuries caused by sexual harassment. These
authors also either explicitly or implicitly perceive an incongruity between
sexual harassment and the very purposes of Title VII. In their view, sexual
harassment is not group-based discrimination; it is an activity directed at
particular individuals.22 A tort of sexual harassment would, in almost all
instances, restrict liability to the employee who actually engages in the harass-
ing behavior.
An amendment of Title VII to provide damages presents a more appropriate
and effective approach to improving the remedy available to the victims of
sexual harassment. Although the impact and injury of sexual harassment is
often very personal, the activity involved is based upon discriminatory views
about appropriate relationships between sexes, not individuals. "[I]t is a group-
18. The tort theory of respondeat superior permits recovery from an employer only if the tortious
activity was committed by an agent of the employer within the scope of employment. See also C. NEWKIRK,
E. VARGYAS & M. GREENBERGER, supra note 5, at 27-28.
19. See, e.g., Terry Dworkin, Laura Ginger, & Jane Mallor, Theories of Recovery for Sexual
Harassment: Going Beyond 7Itle VII, 25 SAN Dmoo L. REV. 125 (1988); Jane Mallor, Discriminatory
Discharge and the Emerging Common Law of Wrongful Discharge, 28 ARmZ. L. REV. 651, 665-68 (1986);
Note, A Theory of Tort Liability, supra note 17; Note, Legal Remedies for Employment-Related Sexual
Harassment, 64 MINN. L. REV. 151 (1979).
20. See C. NEWKIRK, E. VARGYAS & M. GREENBERGER, supra note 5, at 24-28; Dworkin, et. al,
supra note 19, at 137-138; Note, A Theory of Tort Liability, supra note 17, at 1475-85.
21. See, e.g., Ellen Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 333 (1990) (advocating tort of sexual harassment patterned on intentional infliction of
emotional distress); Note, A Theory of Tort Liability, supra note 17, at 1486-88 (proposing tort theory of
sexual harassment based on "reasonable woman" standard); Note, Inadequacies in Civil Rights Law, supra
note 14 (calling for the creation of a federal tort of harassment making only individual harasser liable).
22. See Paul, supra note 21, at 346-53; Note, Inadequacies in Civil Rights Law, supra note 14, at
1157-58. See also Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting,
denial of en banc rehearing) (Title VII is inappropriately applied to "individual harassment.").
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defined injury which occurs to many different individuals regardless of unique
qualities or circumstances, in ways that connect with other deprivations of the
same individuals, among all of whom a single characteristic-female sex-is
shared. Such an injury is in essence a group injury. " ' And "[wihen it has
an impact upon fundamental employment decisions and upon the workplace
atmosphere, sexual harassment is discrimination in employment."24 Regard-
less of whether the behavior in question is intended to intimidate or flatter,
when these acts are unwelcome they interfere with the targeted woman's ability
to participate fully in the workplace and reinforce her social position of sexual
vulnerability. Inclusion of sexual harassment within Title VII most appropriate-
ly places emphasis on its social pathology characteristics.
An additional concern is that employers are the actors in the best position
to eliminate sexual harassment in the workplace,' yet they would not be held
liable for harassment under a sexual harassment tort because of the doctrine
of respondeat superior.26 Since employers are likely to be the only potential
defendants with adequate resources to pay actual damages, there is little hope
for full compensation of all injuries without being able to extend liability to
employers. Furthermore, so long as employers can shield themselves from
liability simply by adopting a policy statement placing sexual harassment
beyond the scope of employment, there is little incentive for employers to take
a more active role in eliminating workplace harassment.
Finally, a formula for proving a sexual harassment case has already been
established by the federal courts,27 whereas a tort of sexual harassment would
have to be established individually in each of the fifty states and the District
of Columbia. In fact, the victims of sexual harassment who are currently
making tort claims in combination with Title VII claims are doing so primarily
in order to obtain compensation for non-economic injury and/or a jury trial
that are otherwise unavailable. The proposed Civil Rights and Women's
Equality in Employment Act of 1991 would correct both of these shortcom-
ings.2
C. Section 1983 Claims
Some victims of sexual harassment may currently be able to make a federal
claim for compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
23. C. MACKINNON, supra note 7, at 172.
24. Id. at 208 (footnote omitted).
25. For discussion on this point, see infra note 67 and accompanying text.
26. See Hunter v. Countryside Assn. for the Handicapped, 710 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. II1. 1989) (No
liability of employer for torts of supervisor who had not acted "in furtherance of employment" when he
raped plaintiff.).
27. This is not to say that improvements in that formula could not be made. The doctrinal inadequacies
of sexual harassment proof and liability standards under Title VII will be discussed infra notes 70-95 and
accompanying text.
28. Damages are discussed infra at notes 52-69 and accompanying text. Jury trials are discussed infra
notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
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also provides a right to a jury trial.29 These types of claims are limited to
situations in which the state is the employer because the discrimination must
occur "under color of state law." But, because of sovereign immunity, the
state itself can not be the defendant in these cases. Relief is therefore available
only to harassed women who work for some agency or subdivision of the state
government in which the employer is a person and not the state per se.
Additionally, a violation § 1983 requires a showing of discriminatory
intent, a requirement ostensibly not present under Title VII. The intent require-
ment, combined with the restriction of § 1983 to those actions occurring
"under color of state law," prohibits a finding of vicarious liability for inten-
tional harassment by a co-worker.30 Section 1983 thus provides only a very
narrow protection and opportunity for remedy.
D. Remedies for Racial Harassment
Race-based discrimination has been the paradigm for federal anti-discrimi-
nation law and judicial doctrine. One of the major theoretical problems of
sexual harassment doctrine is that it does not completely conform to this
established paradigm.3 Some of the incongruities between the remedies for
racial and sexual harassment were addressed by Congress for the first time
during the debate surrounding the Civil Rights Act of 1990. Comparisons of
the legal remedies available for racial and sexual harassment have been very
prominent in the debate surrounding the Act.32 Some of these comparisons
sound very much like the debates surrounding the inclusion of sex in Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. At that time, Martha Griffiths suggested on
the floor of the House of Representatives that if sex were left out of the Act,
Black women would become more privileged than white women.3 In this
section I suggest a less pernicious justification for equalizing the remedies
available for all employment discrimination in violation of Title VII.
Unlike the other groups protected by Title VII, victims of racial discrimina-
tion have traditionally been afforded the opportunity to seek compensatory and
punitive damages for harassment on the job through 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a private cause of action for individuals who are deprived of federally
protected rights by actions under color of state law.
30. See Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1185 (7th Cir. 1986).
31. This is not to suggest that there are no important similarities between race and sex discrimination.
Much of the impact of Catharine MacKinnon's groundbreaking book, Sexual Harassment of Working Wom-
en, stemmed from its successful use of analogies to race-based discrimination.
Among the most important differences between race and sex discrimination cases are the special
evidentiary problems presented by sexual harassment cases. These are discussed infra at notes 70-82, 89-95
and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Steven Holmes, Rights and Business Groups Seek Pact on a Job Bias Bill, N.Y. Times,
March 16, 1991, at All, col. 1; Richard Berke, Partisan Fights Erupt on Rights Bill, N.Y. Times, March
13, 1991, at A22, col. 4; Adam Clymer, Bush Proposes an Alternative Rights Bill, N.Y. Times, March
2, 1991, at A10, col. 4.
33. 110 CONG. REC. 2578-2580 (1964).
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Reconstruction Era non-discrimination statute.34 The Supreme Court in Patter-
son v. McLean Credit Union35 in 1989 rejected this interpretation, ruling that
harassment on the job does not impact the statutorily protected freedom to
contract. However, the decision did leave in place § 1981's prohibition against
race-based discrimination in hiring and firing decisions.36 Although the Civil
Rights and Women's Equality in Employment Act of 1991 would restore the
original understanding that harassment on the job is included within the
provisions of § 1981, it would not extend the protections of this statute to any
other groups." Despite the inapplicability of § 1981 to sexual harassment,
the proposed damages amendment to Title VII would represent a clear Con-
gressional policy statement that all victims of prohibited forms of discrimina-
tion, especially sexual discrimination, are deserving of federal remedy for all
of their discrimination-related injuries."
In addition, because of the "tendency to treat race and gender as mutually
exclusive categories of experience and analysis,"" combined claims of racial
and sexual discrimination are problematic under the existing bifurcated remedy
system. Women of color face jurisdictional problems in claiming coverage
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State
and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens ....
Section 198 l's coverage of race-based employment discrimination is not completely coextensive with Title
VII. Whereas Title VII only applies to employers with more than fifteen employees, § 1981 applies to all
employment situations. Also, Title VII's statute of limitations is shorter.
It is important to note that because the remedies provided are not just equitable, jury trial is available
under § 1981. In a notable recent decision, the Ninth Circuit ruled that when a § 1981 claim is combined
with a Title VII claim, the Seventh Amendment requires the court to follow the jury's factual determinations
in deciding Title VII-based legal claims. Miller v. Fairchild Indus., 885 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 1524 (1990).
35. 109 S.Ct. 2363 (1989).
36. The Court also suggested in dicta that other employment situations, such as decisions regarding
substantial promotions, rising to the level of altering the nature of the contractual employer-employee
relationship remain covered under § 1981. Id. at 2377. But this conception does not seem to include any
harassment situations.
37. The argument has been made by one commentator that § 1981 protections must logically be
extended to sex-based discrimination because of the Supreme Court's decision in McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) to extend § 1981's coverage to whites. See Emily Calhoun, The
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments: Constitutional Authority for Federal Legislation Against Private
Sex Discrimination, 61 MNN. L. REV. 313, 355-58 (1977). However, it now seems highly unlikely that
courts will take that step on their own.
38. See Hearings on S. 2104 Before the Subcomn on Labor of the Senate Comm, on Human
Resources, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (Feb. 27, 1990) (testimony of Marcia Greenberger, managing attorney
of the National Women's Law Center) (available from the National Women's Law Center) [hereinafter
Greenberger testimony].
The change of name of the bill to the Civil Rights and Women's Equality in Employment Act is
apparently an attempt to emphasize the extent to which the bill is designed to help women. See Berke, supra
note 32, at A22, col. 5. However, the new name also has the unfortunate consequence of suggesting that
women's equality in employment is not a civil rights issue.
39. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique
of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 139,
139. See generally BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN (1981) (historical discussion and analysis of inseparabil-
ity of racism from sexism with respect to African American women).
under § 1981, as well as theoretical problems describing their discrimination
within a legal regime that treats sex and race as separately and differently
protected categories.4' An amendment which provides the same remedies for
all intentional discrimination prohibited by Title VII would make it easier for
women of color, who are particularly likely to experience employment discrim-
ination,41 to gain compensation for the full extent of their discrimination-
related injuries .42
III. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
Most of the objections to a damages provision of Title VII are cast in
economic terms. Business organizations and other commentators have argued
that the availability of compensatory and punitive damages would place an
unfair burden on employers, who are often not responsible for the harassing
behavior.43 Many additionally have argued that juries will be prone to grant
damages far in excess of the actual injury, and that many uninjured workers
nonetheless will file lawsuits because of the potential lure of a large payoff.'
Proponents of the measures contained in the 1991 legislation also have
argued that available damages under Title VII must be increased to give
employers adequate incentive to eliminate harassing employment conditions."
This section examines the merits of these opposing economic considerations.
A. The Economic Effects of a Sexually Harassing Work Environment
It is impossible to measure precisely the economic impact of sexual harass-
ment in the American workforce at present. However, there are several
indications that sexual harassment is responsible for a major loss of productivi-
ty to many employers. Current estimates suggest that between forty-two and
eighty percent of American women have experienced sexual harassment at their
workplace.' Victims can suffer from severe physical and psychological
40. Note, Conceptualizing Black Women's Employment Experiences, 98 YALE L.J. 1457, 1468-78
(1989) [hereinafter Note, Black Women's Experiences].
41. Crenshaw, supra note 39, at 141-52.
42. As long as compensation is not available for injuries related to sex-based discrimination, a woman
of color plaintiff in a § 1981 case is disadvantaged in comparison with men of color. A defendant can
theoretically escape liability altogether if he successfully argues that particular injuries at issue are related
to sex-based discrimination as opposed to race-based discrimination. See Greenberger testimony, supra
note 38, at 10.
43. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 32, at All, col. 3 (Business Roundtable advocates limit of$100,000
for harassment and $150,000 for cases of "wanton, willful and egregious discrimination"); Paul, supra
note 21, at 364 (employer should be viewed as ancillary victim of harassment).
44. Sharon LaFraniere, Rights Bill Would Alter Workplace: Measure Allows More Plaintiffs to Seek
Damages in Job-Bias Cases, Wash. Post, June 8, 1990, at AI, col. 4.
45. See. e.g., Greenberger testimony, supra note 38, at 9-10; Note, EmployerLiabilityfor Coworker
Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 83, 104 (1984-85) [hereinafter
Note, Employer Liability].
46. See Donald Maypole, Sexual Harassment at Work: A Review of Research and Theory, 2 AFFILIA
24 (1987); Edward Lafontaine & Leslie Tredeau, The Frequency. Sources, and Correlates of Sexual
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problems like headaches, high blood pressure, insomnia, and anorexia.4
Studies have demonstrated that harassment at work leads to low morale, high
absenteeism, and general reductions in productivity.4 8 High levels of sexual
harassment also have been linked to the increased unionization of predominant-
ly female job categories, indicating women's desire to alter the power dynamic
in the workplace.49 Harassment is both more prevalent and more severe in
traditionally male occupations.50 The especially frequent incidence of harass-
ment in traditionally male occupations has contributed to women's reluctance
to take and keep those jobs. Any reduction in the level of sexual harassment
would therefore seem to offer economic benefits to employers.5'
B. Costs Imposed on Employers by Compensatory and Punitive Damages
Employers are concerned that the addition of compensatory and/or punitive
damages to Title VII would result in dramatic increases in both the volume of
litigation and the size of awards. While it is reasonable to assume that there
will be some such increases, it is unlikely that the burdens will be as large as
those predicted publicly by opponents of the Civil Rights Acts of 1990 and
1991.52
One of the best indications of the future of litigation and awards is the pre-
Patterson record of § 1981 claims for race-based employment harassment. In
examining employer liability, courts have held that, "[wlhen 42 U.S.C. § 1981
and Title VII are alleged as parallel bases of relief, the same elements of proof
Harassment Among Women in Traditional Male Occupations, 15 SEX ROLES 433, 436 (1986).
47. See sources cited supra note 7.
48. See Ken Jennings & Melissa Clapp, A Managerial Tightrope: Balancing Harassed and Harassing
Employees' Rights in Sexual Discrimination Cases, 1989 LABOR L.J. 756, 757; William Kandel, Sexual
Harassment: Persistent, Prevalent, But Preventable, 14 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 439, 440 (1988).
49. See Fred Suggs, Advising Your Corporate Client on Avoiding Charges of Sexual Harassment, 46
ALA. LAWYER 176, 180 (1985); Note, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: Clarifying the Standards of Hostile
Working Environment Sexual Harassment, 25 Hous. L. REv. 441,466 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Clarifying
the Standards].
50. LaFontaine & Tredeau, supra note 46, at 433; see also Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 1991
U.S. Dist. Lexis 794, 43-44 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (describing discriminatory dynamic when women are
"rarity" in particular workplace).
51. Given the costs of sexual harassment described above, one could ask whether employers would
be economically better off without the "hassle" of having women employees at all. It is unlikely that
employers would be able to exclude women from their workplaces without subjecting themselves to
substantial liability under Title VII for sex-based discrimination. Even if they were permitted to hire only
men, however, any potential economic benefits would surely be offset by losses in productivity. By ignoring
a potential workforce that comprises over half of the population, employers would be denying themselves
access to some of the most competent and efficient members of the workforce. Similarly, by reducing the
pool of potential workers, employers lose bargaining power, possibly resulting in more expensive labor,
or less productive labor for the same price. Finally, this question points out the problem limiting a
discussion of discrimination to economic analysis. In this instance, any analysis of the economic factors
surrounding sexual harassment makes a normative presumption that places the burden of sexual harassment
on women, suggesting that it is their presence in the workplace, rather than the presence of the harassers,
that is the "source" of the disruption.
52. See, e.g., LaFraniere, supra note 44, at A16, col. 1 ("Opponents predict the financial incentive
will unleash a flood of lawsuits .... ").
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are required for both actions."" Because the standards of proof and the relief
offered are the same, recent § 1981 awards should be indicative of likely
awards in future suits employing the same damage provision for sex-based
employment discrimination. A survey conducted for the National Women's
Law Center reviewing 576 section 1981 cases between 1980 and 1990 shows
that only sixty-eight of these 576 cases resulted in awards of compensatory or
punitive damages. And of these sixty-eight, only three resulted in awards of
greater than $200,000. s"
It is true that there are more women than minorities employed in the United
States, which presents a much larger pool of potential plaintiffs. For a number
of reasons, however, it is also more difficult to prove sexual harassment. One
significant difference is that sexual harassment is more likely to occur in
private. Furthermore, courts sometimes allow consent as an affirmative defense
to sexual harassment, but not to racial harassment."5 Additionally, because
a certain amount of sexual banter and "courtship" is currently accepted as a
normal occurrence in the American workplace, 6 a sexual harassment plaintiff
is required to demonstrate why the activity complained of is particularly
offensive. 7 Even after a finding of a hostile environment is made, an employ-
er may escape liability altogether if the judge is satisfied that the employer
neither knew, nor should have known, of the occurrence of harassment, or if
the employer took prompt remedial action upon becoming aware of the prob-
lem. 8 Finally, an employer would be liable for punitive damages under the
proposed 1990 and 1991 Acts only if it "engaged in the unlawful employment
practice with malice, or with reckless or callous indifference.""
This list of barriers between plaintiffs and recovery suggests that most of
the potential costs to employers posed by the amendment could be avoided
through sound management. Primarily, employers would be wise to implement
effective sexual harassment education, reporting, and discipline policies. In
the end, this could be one of the most significant benefits of an amended Title
VII, as the goal should be to eliminate workplace harassment, not simply to
assist women who already have been harassed in bringing lawsuits. Women
53. Flanagan v. Aaron E. Henry Com. Health Services Ctr., 876 F.2d 1231, 1233-34 (5th Cir. 1989).
54. Wendy White, Daniel Shelton, A. Mechele Dickerson & Jennifer Toth, Analysis of Damage
Awards Under Section 1981 5 (Mar 14, 1990) (unpublished manuscript, available from the National
Women's Law Center).
55. See generally Note, Perceptions of Harm: The Consent Defense in Sexual Harassment Cases, 71
IowA L. REV. 1109 (1986) [hereinafter Note, The Consent Defense].
56. Note, Inadequacies in Civil Rights Law, supra note 14, at 1154-59.
57. This is not to suggest that racial harassment must not satisfy any threshold of offensiveness. See
Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977). However, the level of
judicial and social tolerance for racially harassing behavior seems to be much lower.
58. See EEOC guidelines, infra notes 70, 83, and 84. Note, however, that the EEOC, In its brief in
Meritor, argued against strict liability for employers. Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission as Amici Curiae at 13, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986);
see also Steve Nelson, DOJ Brief Departs From Guidelines on Harassment, Legal Times, Jan. 27, 1986,
at 1, col. 1.
59. Civil Rights Act of 1990, supra note 9.
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who have suffered discrimination must be able to recover compensation, but
litigation alone is an inadequate and clumsy method for remedying systemic
discrimination.6"
C. Incentives for Employers under an Amended Title VII
The previously detailed productivity costs of sexual harassment to employ-
ers suggest that every rational utility-maximizing employer is already making
reasonable efforts to end workplace harassment, and that the added threat of
compensatory and punitive damages would not further reduce sexual harass-
ment.61 Leaving aside the inherent problems of applying rationality assumptions
to human actors, there is reason to think that the incentives imposed by the
amendments to Title VII would in fact alter employer behavior in a positive
way.
Most crucially, the passage of a new Civil Rights Act will educate employ-
ers about sexual harassment. Although sexual harassment is not a new phenom-
enon, only recently has it been recognized as a problem by employers and
policy makers. Although the debate surrounding proposed amendments to Title
VII has drawn increased attention to the issue of sexual harassment, enactment
of a new Civil Rights Act focusing in part upon remedying sexual harassment
in the workplace would send a far more powerful and public message to all
employers. The high rate of sexual harassment claims received by the
EEOC62 is evidence that employers are not fully aware of the problem, do
not care about sexual harassment, or are unable to reduce the level of harass-
ment in their working environments. Despite the high reported incidence of
sexual harassment, it is improbable that most employers are deliberately
encouraging or allowing sexual harassment to continue. Corporate managers
(along with many other people) tend to ignore potential issues of discrimination
until forced to confront them. This phenomenon suggests that many employers
currently possess incomplete or inaccurate information about the issue of sexual
harassment.63
Enactment of the Civil Rights Act would also give employers added
economic incentive to investigate both the nature of sexual harassment in their
workplaces and possible solutions to the problem. The same employers who
have failed to respond to the threat of reinstatement and/or back pay currently
provided by Title VII may also fail to react to the addition of compensatory
60. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42
VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1215 (1989).
61. See, e.g., Kandel, supra note 48, at 440-41; Note, Clarifying the Standards, supra note 49, at
466-67.
62. See Note, Inadequacies in Civil Rights Law, supra note 14, at 1160, n.7.
63. For a discussion of the similar model of corporate response to potential tort liability, see Mark
Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. 1, 14-16 (1986) (tendency among group
members to suppress or fail to recognize information contrary to group interests may explain management
failure to respond to large liability exposure.).
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and punitive damages to the statute. But this seems unlikely, given that most
of the actual damages suffered by victims of sexual harassment cannot be
remedied through back-pay or reinstatement.' Thus, under a broader remedy
system, recalcitrant employers would have to contend with a much larger
monetary threat. The intangible costs of sexual harassment would no longer
be externalized onto the victim under the proposed law. If there are employers
who encourage a sexually harassing environment, they should be subjected to
punitive damages. Even invidious discriminators will eventually be swayed by
the threat of greater penalties.
Another critical issue is the possibility that increased damages would impact
labor relations and contracts for unionized employers. It has become a common
phenomenon for arbitrators to reduce or overturn employer sanctions imposed
on sexually harassing employees.65 At the same time, the federal courts have
authority to require employers to grant relief to victims of discrimination that
conflicts with union agreements.66 In order to avoid union conflicts when
attempting to address the problem of sexual harassment, employers will need
to take more preemptive actions to reduce harassment prior to the need for
sanctions. Additionally, large employers may want to negotiate for a harass-
ment complaint and sanction system as part of the regular collective bargaining
process in order to reduce post-sanction appeals by penalized employees and
circumvent the likelihood of litigation by harassed employees. Even if an
employer faces competing obligations under Title VII and a collective bargain-
ing agreement, the employer has the option of joining the union as a party to
the litigation, thus allowing the judge to take responsibility for altering an
unacceptable contract.
D. Are These Burdens and Incentives "Fair" to Employers?
It is reasonable to assume that there will be some financial impact on
employers as a result of the new damages provision even though the ultimate
financial burden is impossible to quantify. Any additional burden imposed on
employers for the elimination of workplace discrimination is, however, consis-
tent with equitable legal principles and analogous duties already assumed by
employers in other contexts, as well as with the dual purposes of Title VII.
First, placing liability on employers for workplace harassment is consistent
with the tort principles supporting strict liability.67 This theory of strict liabili-
64. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
65. See Jennings & Clapp, supra note 48, at 756-57.
66. See Franks v. Bowman Transp., 424 U.S. 747, 774-79 (1976) (granting, under Title VII,
retroactive seniority status, despite union contract, to remedy race discrimination). See also Ellison v.
Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 883 (9th Cir. 1991) (criticizing transfer of employee back to original workplace in
exchange for agreement to drop union grievance that objected to discipline for sexual harassment); Newsday
v. Long Island Typographical Union, 915 F.2d 840, (2d Cir. 1990) (vacating arbitrator's award reinstating
sexual harasser because arbitrator disregarded public policy against sexual harassment).
67. See Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1985) (cheapest cost avoider rationale
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ty was part of the justification for the creation of the worker's compensation
system, which places on the employer the cost of all physical injuries which
occur in the course of employment. As with work safety, the employer is the
actor in the best position to eliminate workplace harassment. In fact, it is
probably more likely that employers can have a positive effect on non-work-
related behavior like harassment than on work-related accidents, many of
which occur as a result of unavoidable workplace hazards.
Secondly, employers can already be held liable for compensatory and
punitive damages for employment discrimination based on race. Employers
should bear a similar responsibility for all forms of illegal employment dis-
crimination.6" Even if Congress does not amend § 1981 to once again apply
to on-the-job harassment, only a uniform liability standard for all prohibited
harassment under Title VII will ensure that discrimination involving more than
one impermissible factor-like race and sexual harassment against a Black
woman-clearly qualifies as discrimination.69
IV. PROBLEMS BEYOND DAMAGES
Although an amendment to Title VII providing for damages would make
more adequate compensation available to successful plaintiffs, it would not
resolve many of the important interpretive and evidentiary problems surround-
ing sexual harassment adjudication. This section outlines the most pressing of
these issues.
A. The Hostile Working Environment: How Hostile Does it Have to Be?
Although the text of the EEOC's definition of sexual harassment 7 has
now been accepted almost universally by the courts, uncertainty remains as
to the amount and severity of harassment needed to create a hostile working
environment.71 The irony of this confusion is that because of the prevalence
justifies strict liability on employers for sex discrimination to prevent the hiring and retention of sexist
supervisors.).
68. See Greenberger testimony, supra note 38, at 10-11.
69. See Note, Black Women's Experiences, supra note 40, at 1476-78.
70. The EEOC guidelines state that:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made
either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission
to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions
affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfer-
ing with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment.
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R § 1604.1 l(a) (1980).
71. See, e.g., Comment, A Right with Questionable Bite: The Future of 'Abusive or Hostile Work
Environment' Sexual Harassment as a Cause ofAction for Women in a Gender-Biased Society and Legal
System, 23 NEw ENG. L. REV. 263, 268-72 (1988); Note, Clarifying the Standards, supra note 49, at 448-
58.
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of sexually harassing behavior throughout American society and particularly
in certain job categories, courts often require plaintiffs to prove an extraordi-
nary level of abuse.' Current applications of Title VII thus seem to protect
an acceptable "background level" of harassment.
The conception of sexual harassment as behavior which involves "fine line"
as opposed to "bright line" determinations complicates further the question of
proof of sexual harassment. It is entirely possible, even likely, that behavior
viewed as harassing by the plaintiff is perceived by the defendant and maybe
even the judge or jury as "joking" or "normal" behavior. Because of incongru-
ities between the typical perceptions of the victim and the harasser, it does not
make sense for the actions in question to be evaluated by a "reasonable
person" standard.73 Such a standard is too ambiguous and does not explicitly
recognize the possibility that sexual harassment may be carried out through
behavior widely perceived as socially acceptable.74 A standard that makes
more sense within the context of Title VII's goal of eliminating the employ-
ment barriers facing victims of discrimination is the viewpoint of a "reasonable
woman" or a "reasonable victim."
A reasonable victim standard would take into account the fact that most
victims of sexual harassment are women. But it also would be flexible enough
to accommodate the multiply disadvantaged woman who belongs to other
protected classes, as well as the rare male victims. The real significance of
adopting a gendered standard is not simply to recognize that women are the
targets of sexual harassment, but to acknowledge that a woman's perception
of harassing behavior can be different from that of a man.75 Researchers of
women's intellectual development have noted that the vast incidence of sexual
abuse in this country significantly affects women's "learning and relationships
to authority. "76
Recent cases demonstrate that once the perspective of the victim is recog-
72. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff must
demonstrate that "reasonable person" would suffer adverse psychological affects under similar circumstanc-
es and that plaintiff was actually offended.).
An analysis of the process through which the longstanding and widespread discrimination and abuse
inflicted upon a group within a society becomes incorporated into the definitions of "reasonable activity"
and "harm" for that society is beyond the scope of this article. It is sufficient to note that the recognition
of sexual harassment as a pervasive phenomenon in our society should lead us to question the use of any
standard which measures the harm experienced by any particular women by the common experiences of
all members of the society.
73. For a lengthy and insightful discussion of the biased nature of the reasonable person standard in
sexual harassment doctrine see Nancy Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of
Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L. J. 1177 (1990).
74. The fact that socially acceptable behavior may nonetheless oppress a particular group within society
is easy to comprehend with respect to social practices that are now at a safe distance (e.g., slavery, bride
burning, foot-binding or anti-miscegenation laws). Unfortunately, much of the behavior which constitutes
sexual harassment today is not actionable because it has not received similar recognition, perhaps because
it is too close.
75. Abrams, supra note 60, at 1202-03.
76. MARY BELENKY, BLYTHE CLINCHY, NANCY GOLDBERGER, JELL TARULE, WOMEN'S WAYS OF
KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF, VOICE AND MIND 58 (1986).
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nized, courts gain better insight into behavior that is actually harassing to
women in the workplace regardless of the intentions of the perpetrators. In
Ellison v. Brady, Judge Beezer of the Ninth Circuit explained the court's
rationale for employing a "reasonable woman" test as follows:
We realize that there is a broad range of viewpoints among women as
a group, but we believe that many women share common concerns
which men do not necessarily share. For example, because women are
disproportionately victims of rape and sexual assault, women have a
stronger incentive to be concerned with sexual behavior. Women who
are victims of mild forms of sexual harassment may understandably
worry whether a harasser's conduct is merely a prelude to violent
sexual assault. Men, who are rarely victims of sexual assault, may view
sexual conduct in a vacuum without a full appreciation of the social
setting or the underlying threat of violence that a woman may per-
ceive.'
Of course, even the use of a reasonable woman standard does not complete-
ly circumvent the phenomenon of ratifying a certain amount of discriminatory
conduct simply because it is pervasive. However, the standard is a flexible one
that will hopefully reflect continuing social progress. It is also important to
note that a reasonable woman standard sends a meaningful and empowering
message to women. For the first time, sex discrimination law is beginning to
recognize the scope of permissible treatment in the workplace by reference to
what women find intolerable.
B. The Consent Defense
Another controversial issue in sexual harassment litigation is the affirmative
defense of consent by the plaintiff to the allegedly harassing behavior.78 As
historically has occurred in rape cases, some sexual harassment defendants
argue that failure to object to sexual activity or talk is equivalent to consent. 79
Even worse, some defendants have argued that a plaintiff's objections could
not be taken seriously because other past or present behavior indicated that the
defendant's conduct was welcome. It is inappropriate to infer plaintiff's consent
short of evidence that she explicitly and affirmatively indicated her consent to
77. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 871, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (footnotes omitted). This case involved a
woman who had received two "love letters," one of them bizarre and threatening, from a co-worker. The
case had been dismissed by the lower court for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
In another case this-year, Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis 794 (1991), the
judge employed a reasonable woman test to find that an atmosphere of pervasive sexually-oriented pictures,
sexual jokes, and sexual remarks was sufficient to constitute a sexually harassing working environment.
78. See Note, The Consent Defense, supra note 55.
79. See id. at 1120-23.
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the defendant." The EEOC and the courts should therefore employ a strong
but rebuttable presumption that any behavior which could be perceived by its
object as harassing is unwelcome.
Claims raised by some commentators that such a presumption would stifle
"legitimate" sexual overtures in the workplace8' or, worse yet, impinge on
an individual's constitutional right to engage in courtship, 2 seem vastly
overrated. Coerced sexual conduct is not necessary to a successful courtship.
Neither does it appear to be an unreasonable restraint on workplace socializing
to penalize office aggressors who impose their sexual attentions or sex-stereo-
typed expectations on unwilling recipients. Elimination of actual harassment
in employment can not be accomplished if victims must also fight against a
legal system which presumes that their claims are not well-grounded. This is
especially critical because sexual harassment often takes place in the absence
of third-party witnesses.
C. Employer Liability for Harassment by Non-Superiors
The EEOC guidelines provide for strict employer liability for the harassing
actions of its supervisors and agents.8 3 For the harassing actions of both co-
workers and non-employees in the workplace, the guidelines recommend that
the employer only be liable for actions of which it was aware or should have
been aware. Even then, the employer may still avoid liability if it can show
that it took immediate, appropriate corrective actions.'
Some commentators have argued that this liability standard places an unfair
80. The Circuit Court in the Meritor Savings Bank case recognized the inherently unequal power
distributions in the workplace, finding that consent in the face of coercion is not consent. Vinson v. Taylor,
753 F.2d 141, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
81. See Paul, supra note 21, at 357-59.
82. See Note, Inadequacies in Civil Rights Law, supra note 14, at 1155-58.
83. The guidelines state:
Applying general Title VII principles, an employer, employment agency, joint apprenticeship
committee or labor organization (hereinafter collectively referred to as "employer") is responsible
for its acts and those of its agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment
regardless of whether the specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the
employer and regardless of whether the eployerknew or should have known of their occurrence.
The Commission will examine the circumstances of the particular employment relationship and
the job junctions [sic] performed by the individual in determining whether an individual acts in
either a supervisory or agency capacity.
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 I(c) (1980) (emphasis added).
84. The guidelines state:
With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual
harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows
or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate
corrective action.
An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees, with respect to sexual
harassment of employees in the workplace, where the employer (or its agents or supervisory
employees) knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropri-
ate corrective action. In reviewing these cases the Commission will consider the extent of the
employer's control and any other legal responsibility which the employer may have with respect
to the conduct of such non-employees.
Id. at § 1604.11(d)-(e).
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burden on employers.8" Even the EEOC in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
argued that the employer should only be liable for the supervisors' actions if
the employer knew or should have known of the harassment, despite the
contrary position of the EEOC's official guidelines.8 6 In Meritor, the Supreme
Court explicitly refrained from resolving the issue. The Court rejected both
the absolute liability standard and the actual knowledge test, simply directing
lower courts to principles of agency for guidance in resolving the issue.8
7
A strong argument has been made that, under the current standards,
employers can still escape liability by taking a "head in the sand" approach
to co-worker harassment.88 It is essential that the standards for employer
liability provide the maximum incentive for elimination of workplace harass-
ment. Yet it may be unfair and ineffective to hold employers liable for activi-
ties and/or situations over which they have no real influence. An intermediate
standard between strict liability and the "known or should have known"
standards may be the most appropriate. Such a standard might require employ-
ers to have an effective harassment reporting mechanism, and might impose
a burden upon employers in particular cases to demonstrate that any alleged
harassment was beyond the possible reach of the employer's influence.
D. Admissability of Past Behavior Evidence
In rape cases, victims are protected by Federal Rule of Evidence 412 from
misuse of evidence of past sexual behavior. 9 No comparable rule exists for
85. See, e.g., Paul, supra note 21, at 353, 357, 363; Note, Inadequacies of Civil Rights Law, supra
note 14, at 1169.
86. See sources cited in notes 58 and 83.
87. 477 U.S. 57, 69-72. The "principles of agency" comprise a fairly large and non-specific collection
of liability concepts. Most courts look to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY in making liability
determinations.
88. Linda Kreiger & Cindi Fox, Evidentiary Issues in Sexual Harassment Litigation, 1 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 115, 134 (1986); Note, Employer Liability, supra note 45, at 95-99.
89. Federal Rule of Evidence 412 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which a person is
accused of rape or of assault with intent to commit rape, reputation or opinion evidence of the
past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of such rape or assault is not admissible.
(b) [Evidence] of a victim's past sexual behavior other than reputation or opinion evidence
is also not admissible, unless such evidence ... is-
(1) [Constitutionally] required to be admitted; or
(2) admitted in accordance with subdivision (c) and is evidence of-
(A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the accused, offered by the
accused upon the issue of whether the accused was or was not, with respect to the alleged victim,
the source of semen or injury; or
(B) past sexual behavior with the accused and is offered by the accused upon
the issue of whether the alleged victim consented to the sexual behavior with respect to which
rape or assault is alleged.
(c) (1) If the person accused of committing rape or assault with intent to commit rape intends
to offer under subdivision (b) evidence of specific instances of the alleged victim's past sexual
behavior, the accused shall make a written motion to offer such evidence not later than fifteen
days before the date on which the trial in which such evidence is to be offered is scheduled to
begin ....
(2) The motion described in paragraph (1) shall be accompanied by a written offer of
Title VII litigation of sexual harassment claims, despite the fact that most of
the same considerations apply.9 ° The lack of a specific evidence rule restrict-
ing the use of sexual history evidence is a serious potential problem in each
sexual harassment trial. The problem is compounded by the fact that amend-
ments to Title VII to allow for compensatory and punitive damages would
necessitate the use of jury trials at the request of either party.91 Juries are
generally more likely than judges to misinterpret or overemphasize sexual
history testimony.92
The use of testimony and even discovery relating to the plaintiff's sexual
history will rarely be relevant and can often impede the enforcement of Title
VII's prohibition against sexual harassment. In addition to the possibility that
juries will misinterpret such evidence, the use of sexual history as a defense
to sexual harassment claims reinforces a public perception that harassed women
somehow ask for what they receive.93 Furthermore, victims may be discour-
aged from bringing claims or pressured into dropping or settling meritorious
claims due to the threat of public embarrassment through use of sexual history
testimony or even pretrial discovery.94 Serious commitment to enforcement
of a national policy against sexual harassment demands that these victims be
accorded the same protections as rape victims against improper use of sexual
history evidence.95
proof. If the court determines that the offer of proof contains evidence described in subdivision
(b), the court shall order a hearing in chambers to determine if such evidence is admissible ...
(3) If the court determines on the basis of the hearing described in paragraph (2) that
the evidence which the accused seeks to offer is relevant and that the probative value of such
evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, such evidence shall be admissible in the trial
to the extent an order made by the court specifies evidence which may be offered and areas with
respect to which the alleged victim may be examined or cross-examined.
(d) For purposes of this rule, the term "past sexual behavior" means sexual behavior other
than the sexual behavior with respect to which rape or assault with intent to commit rape is
alleged.
90. See, e.g., Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755, 757-62 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (denying motion to overturn
magistrate's protective order disallowing discovery of details of plaintiff's sexual history for ten years prior
to alleged incident).
91. See supra note 10.
92. Although there have been no studies ofjury use of sexual history information in sexual harassment
cases, the misuse of sexual history information by juries in rape trials has been demonstrated. Arnie Cann,
Lawrence Calhoun & James Selby, Attributing Responsibility to the Victim of Rape: Influence of Information
Regarding Past Sexual Experience, 32 HUMAN RELATIONS 57 (1979) (empirical study of jury misuse of
sexual history information in rape trials). See also Catherine O'Neill, Sexual Harassment Cases and the
Law of Evidence: A Proposed Rule, 1989 U. C-n. LEGAL FORUM 219, 229 (discussing the likelihood of
jury misuse of sexual history information in sexual harassment litigation).
93. See O'Neill, supra note 92, at 232.
94. See Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. at 761.
95. In only one instance will sexual history or reputation evidence be relevant as evidence during a
sexual harassment trial when it would not be during a rape trial. A plaintiff's own workplace conduct and
reputation conceivably may be considered relevant to the question of whether or not a sexually charged
work atmosphere was actually offensive to plaintiff. Even this evidence would not be as relevant if the
standard is one of a "reasonable woman," however, because a plaintiff's subjective response to the behavior
in question is less likely to be divergent from an objective "reasonable woman" test.
1991] Title VII
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS IN TITLE VII
Although many of the proposed changes in and amendments to Title VII
discussed in this article would pose few implementation issues, an amended
prohibition against sexual harassment will present new complexities which
should be addressed either through additional legislation, EEOC guidelines,
or judicial interpretation. This section addresses the three most serious of these
issues: additional burdens on the judicial system, the jury trial requirement,
and level of damages assessments.
A. Additional Burdens on the Judicial System
One of the most common objections to an increase in available damages
under Title VII is that it will place a greater burden on the federal judicial
system, both because the possibility of damages will trigger a number of new
cases and because increased caseloads and the jury requirement will complicate
the judicial resolution of all sexual harassment claims brought under Title
VII.96 Although the possibility of compensatory and punitive damages does
present a new wrinkle to Title VII claims, it is not a radical change from the
past. The amendment merely brings Title VII into line with the damages
previously available to victims of employment discrimination under § 1981 and
to victims of state-sponsored employment discrimination under § 1983.
As discussed earlier, it is unlikely that the amendments will result in
frequent and large punitive damage awards.97 The possibility of recovering
compensatory damages, however, may well provide a stimulus for additional
sexual harassment claims."' This result is probable because under existing
Title VII law, there is little incentive for a sexual harassment victim with a
valid claim to bring suit unless she can show substantial economic injury."
The fact that more actual victims of sexual harassment may be encouraged to
file claims is certainly not a sensible reason to oppose amendment to Title VII.
Any additional burdens imposed on the judicial system are justified by the
worthwhile goal of eliminating workplace sexual harassment.
It should be noted, however, that the fact that more adequate compensation
may be available to victims of sexual harassment does not guarantee the filing
of additional claims. It is possible that the increased Congressional emphasis
96. See, e.g., Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1264 (1971); LaFraniere, supra note 44, at A16, col. 1. The Bush
Administration's own proposed civil rights bill does not allow for jury trials for sexual harassment,
apparently due to fear of creating a "lawyer's bonanza." Clymer, supra note 32, at AI0, col. 6.
97. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
98. See Dworkin, Ginger & Mallor, supra note 19, at 131.
99. See Mitchell v. OsAir, 629 F. Supp. 636, 643 (N.D. Ohio 1986) ("There is little incentive for
a plaintiff to bring a Title VII suit when the best she can hope for is an order to her supervisor and to her
employer to treat her with the dignity she deserves and the costs of bringing her suit."). See also supra
notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
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on the problems of sexual harassment, combined with the threat of larger
damage awards, will encourage more employers to take preemptive action to
eliminate harassment. Even after claims have been filed, the threat of larger
damage awards will increase the incentives for employers to settle suits prior
to adjudication. Thus, there is simply no hard evidence to support the claim
that federal courts will be flooded with Title VII claims if increased damages
become available.
B. Jury Trials
Commentators have suggested that Title VII employment discrimination
cases present complex and technical questions that are beyond jurors' com-
petence."°° But there is no evidence that jury trials have been problematic
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) or the Equal Pay
Act, both of which allow for jury trial and are administered and enforced by
the EEOC in a virtually identical manner to Title VII. 1°1 In fact, the Ninth
Circuit already requires that courts follow the implicit and explicit factual
determinations made by juries in cases combining Title VII claims with those
based on § 1981.102
The more important issue regarding jury trials of sexual harassment claims
is the potential amplification of problems which currently exist in sexual
harassment litigation and are not posed by other types of employment discrimi-
nation cases. First, it is imperative that sexual harassment plaintiffs be protect-
ed from use of sexual history or reputation evidence in a jury trial.l" Sec-
ond, because of the ambiguity currently surrounding the standard for judging
harassing conduct," the courts should promptly adopt a "reasonable wom-
an" or "reasonable victim" standard. 10 5
C. Level of Damages
Sexual harassment litigation may also present damages issues not present
in other employment discrimination cases. For example, hostile work environ-
ment harassment is currently treated by the EEOC in an identical manner as
quid pro quo harassment."" However, some courts have indicated that they
view quid pro quo harassment as a more serious problem than a hostile work
environment.0 7 It will be up to individual juries to make that determination
100. See Developments in the Law, supra note 96, at 1260.
101. See Note, Restoring itle VII, supra note 5, at 1629-30.
102. Miller v. Fairchild Indus., 885 F.2d 498, 507 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1524
(1990).
103. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
106. See EEOC guidelines on employer liability, supra notes 83, 84.
107. See Note, Employer Liability, supra note 45, at 95-96.
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through damage awards under the proposed new law.
A second issue which will undoubtedly arise is the relevance of the individ-
ual plaintiff's character to the determination of damages. It seems likely that
defendants will want to introduce evidence indicating that plaintiff was not
actually offended by a work environment which would be offensive to the
reasonable victim. °s Alternatively, defendants will want to argue that be-
cause of a particular plaintiff's promiscuity, the coerced sexual acts were not
damaging to her."° EEOC guidelines should explicitly address this potential
problem, and judges should be vigilant in disallowing such inappropriate and
offensive lines of argument.
VI. CONCLUSION
The sexual harassment prohibition of Title VII provides meaningful assur-
ance to millions of American workers. Nonetheless, Title VII currently
provides inadequate protection or remedy. The proposed amendments to Title
VII contained in the Civil Rights Acts of 1990 and 1991 offer a necessary
remedy that is currently unavailable. Despite President Bush's veto last year,
there is apparent bipartisan agreement that Title VII should be altered to
improve its effectiveness as a bar against sexual harassment."' However,
the politicians and civil rights leaders involved in the debate over the Civil
Rights Act of 1990 missed many important issues.
The unique nature of sexual harassment poses particular challenges for
implementation of Title VII's protections which should be carefully addressed.
Both the addition of compensatory and punitive damages, and the correction
of the additional evidence and standards problems outlined in this article, are
necessary if Title VII is to achieve its dual goals of prohibiting the occurrence
of employment discrimination, and making the victims of such discrimination
whole.
108. See O'Neill, supra note 92, at 236.
109. Id.
110. See supra note 10.
111. See Mitchell v. OsAir, 629 F. Supp. 636, 643 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (Congressional action is
necessary to improve adequacy of Title VII's prohibition of sexual harassment and its remedy to victims.).
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